ABSTRACT The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) is one of the most promising applications of the newly emerging wearable devices and body-area networks. Generally, the IoMT devices are composed of lightweight facilities, which collect the health data (i.e., heart rate, body temperature, and respiratory rate) and upload them to the cloud. As the medical information is sensitive for the data owners (DOs), it is critical to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of these outsourced data. Normally, blinding (or encryption) and auditing are classical methods for achieving these goals. However, until to now, quite a few batch auditing schemes have been proposed, and they all share the following two shortcomings: 1) lacking of an efficient mechanism to identify the corrupted data files once the batch auditing task fails and 2) the communication overhead of audit phase increases linearly with the number of data files being audited or the number of data blocks being challenged. In order to overcome the above issues, in this paper, we propose an efficient batch auditing scheme based on the Lucas sequence for IoMT. To be specific, utilizing the self-query technique and polynomial commitment technique, we reduce the communication complexity of the batch auditing phase from linear to a constant scale. In addition, according to the recursion of the Lucas sequence, we design a novel search method for efficiently identifying the corrupted data files when the batch auditing task fails. The security of our scheme ensures that curious third-party auditor and cloud service provider cannot gain any real-data contents of the DO files. The detailed experiments show that our scheme is more efficient than the existing batch auditing schemes in terms of the communication overhead of the audit phase and the efficiency in identifying the corrupted files when the batch auditing task fails.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an important part of the new information technology. It is widely used in the integration of the network through intelligent perception, recognition technology and pervasive computing [1] . The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT), one of the most promising fields in IoT domains, is the collection of medical devices and applications that connect to healthcare IT systems via Internet. It is the IoMT's foundation that these medical devices equipped with short-range communications (such as Bluetooth) or long-range communications (such as LTE) capability achieve the machine-to-machine communications [2] - [4] .
One demonstrative and widely adopted system model [5] for the IoMT is shown in Fig. 1 .
However, there are two fundamental issues that cannot be overlooked in the IoMT. The first issue is the storage and management of data [5] - [8] . For example, suppose a person wears a single pulse sensor that communicates hourly with a cloud storage database via the Low-Power WideArea Network (LPWAN). One thousand people would output 168,000 new data points per week. The volume of data even scales up dramatically with the increase number of sensors [5] . Massive data may become a burden if it cannot be stored correctly and managed efficiently. Another issue is data integrity and confidentiality [9] - [13] . The data integrity is a basic premise, regardless of which platform provides storage services for these medical data. In addition, the data confidentiality is an important safeguard since medical data are very sensitive and contain inestimable commercial value.
Fortunately, cloud storage service platform is a very appropriate way to solve above issues. Data Owners (DOs) can move their massive medical data into the cloud since they lack powerful storage and management abilities. By outsourcing these data to cloud servers, DOs not only liberate the misery from the management of the complex hardware system, but also relieve the burden from the storage and maintenance of the local data. Furthermore, regardless of when and where, DOs can gain access to their outsourced data in a network environment.
Although the cloud storage makes these advantages more appealing than ever, it also brings new challenges and security threats towards the DOs' outsourced data. When DOs outsource their data to the cloud, they have to give up the right of physical possession of their outsourced data, and allow Cloud Service Provider (CSP) to carry out some operations for their data. As a result, the integrity of outsourced data is put at risk due to the following reasons [14] , [15] . First, software faults or hardware failure of cloud servers could lead to the loss of DOs' outsourced data. Second, hackers may compromise the cloud servers and obtain DOs' data contents. In addition, the CSP may disobey the Service Level Agreements (SLAs), and delete some data infrequently accessed by DOs for the sake of economic interests or take the way of offline storage. Apparently, although large-scale data outsourcing to cloud servers provides a viable solution for IoMT, it does not offer any guarantee on the data integrity. Thus, it is vital and urgent to investigate public cloud auditing approaches for IoMT.
A. RELATED WORK
In recent years, various notions of Provable Data Possession (PDP) mechanism have been proposed under different systems and security models, such as, the Message Authentication Code-based PDP mechanisms (MAC-PDP) [16] , [17] , the homomorphic property of the RSA signature-based PDP mechanisms (RSA-PDP) [16] , [18] , [19] , the BLS short signature-based PDP mechanism (BLS-PDP) [20] , PDP mechanisms supporting data dynamic operations (DPDP) [21] - [23] , and PDP mechanisms protecting data privacy (PP-PDP) [20] , [24] .
Until now, more and more public cloud auditing schemes [25] - [32] , [38] - [40] are proposed based on the above PDP mechanisms, which implement a variety of capabilities while verifying data integrity. For example, a public cloud auditing scheme with efficient user dynamic revocation: Panda [25] , a homomorphic authenticable ring signature for public auditing on shared data [26] , an efficient public verification of data integrity based on the indistinguishability obfuscation [27] , a public auditing scheme for the cloudbased wireless body area network [28] , a public auditing scheme with privacy protection in a multi-user model [29] , a certificateless public auditing scheme for cloud-assisted wireless body area networks [30] . However, all these schemes do not support batch auditing. In real scenarios, a large number of auditing delegations may be simultaneously requested by different DOs, while auditing these tasks individually will make the TPA tedious and inefficient. Therefore, it is paramount that the TPA can concurrently handle multiple auditing tasks upon receiving auditing requests from different DOs.
Fortunately, a basic privacy-preserving public auditing scheme is proposed by Wang et al. [31] , which can achieve the batch auditing. Meanwhile, it simply suggests that the Binary search should be regarded as an identification method of corrupted data files when the batch auditing task fails. Whereafter, Jin et al. [32] adopt the computing framework of MapReduce to design a batch auditing scheme, which computes the multiple auditing tasks parallelly. Unfortunately, the scheme cannot apply on a large scale application because it has very high requirements for TPA's device configuration. Shen et al. [33] propose an efficient public auditing protocol and a novel dynamic structure for cloud data. This protocol supports the data dynamics, blockless verification and batch auditing. However, there is no illustration on how to identify the corrupted data files when the batch auditing task fails. In all these above schemes, they cannot provide any efficient measures and detailed descriptions to search the corrupted data files when the batch auditing task fails. In addition, in all existing public cloud auditing schemes, the communication overhead of the audit phase has a positive correlation with the number of data blocks being challenged, or the number of data files being audited. This growing communication cost will affect the efficiency of the batch auditing when the network environment is poor. Thus, it is urgent but challenging to design an efficient batch auditing scheme and a novel search method for corrupted data files, which are our main focus in this paper.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, an efficient public batch auditing scheme for IoMT is proposed, then a novel search method of corrupted data files based on the Lucas sequence is designed. Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
1) Constant-size communication overhead
In our scheme, the communication overhead of the audit phase is reduced from linear level to a constant by using the self-query technique and polynomial commitment technique. First, the self-query technique uses Pseudo-random Permutation (PRP) and Pseudorandom Function (PRF) to generate the position indexes and corresponding coefficients of challenged data blocks, respectively. The size of the auditing challenge is reduced to a constant. Second, the auditing proof can be calculated as a constant-size commitment through the polynomial commitment technique. The detailed performance analysis is given in Subsubsection VI. C. 1), which shows that our scheme is more efficient in communication cost with comparing to the existing batch auditing schemes.
2) Data confidentiality
Our scheme protects data privacy against the curious TPA and CSP. First, DOs employ the Random Masking Technique (RMT) to blind each data blocks and store blinded data files into cloud servers. Thus, the curious CSP is unable to obtain any real data contents when it provides the storage service for DOs. Furthermore, the evidence is well hidden by using the polynomial commitment technique in the process of the auditing proof generation. Similarly, the curious TPA cannot derive the DOs' data contents when it replaces DOs to verify data integrity.
3) Novel search method for corrupted data files
Our scheme provides a new search method for corrupted data files when the batch auditing task fails. 
C. ORGANIZATION
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II displays the system model and design goals. Section III introduces some related preliminaries. Subsequently, we provide the detailed description of our proposed batch auditing scheme and the novel search method of the corrupted data files in Section IV. Section V and VI discuss security analysis and performance analysis, respectively. Finally, Section VII gives the conclusion and future work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIGN GOALS A. THE SYSTEM MODEL
The Cloud Storage System (CSS) considered in this paper consists of four separate entities, as shown in Fig. 2 . Each entity is specifically defined as follows. The Users could be the medical institutions, doctors, nurses, patients, or legitimate groups and so on. They are authorized by the data owners to access and share their data stored in cloud servers.
The Data Owners (DOs) wear many different Medical Sensors (such as blood pressure sensors, pulse sensors, body temperature sensors, and pulse oximetry sensors), which continuously produce new data for them. DOs outsource their massive data to cloud servers because they have limited storage space. They can access their data at anytime and anywhere in a network environment.
The Cloud Servers (CSs), managed by an honest and curious Cloud Service Provider (CSP), have obvious advantages in providing large storage space, powerful computation VOLUME 7, 2019 capability and the data sharing.(CS and CSP will not be distinguished in the following sections).
The Third Party Auditor (TPA) is honest and curious, and it has expertise and capability to verify the integrity of these cloud data on behalf of the DOs.
The DOs mainly rely on the CSP to store and maintain their data. Meanwhile, they always want to protect the data privacy from the curious CSP. They can also dynamically interact with the CSP to access their stored data for various applications. Because the DOs no longer possess data copies, it is critically important to ensure that their outsourced data are correctly stored and maintained. To reduce the computation overhead and the online burden potentially brought by the correctness verification for stored data, the DOs can delegate TPA to verify the integrity of their data, while ensuring that the TPA can get nothing from the verification process too.
Within this system model, our batch auditing scheme works as below. The DOs process their data files and store blinded data files to cloud servers. They then can delete these raw data files and blinded data files to save local-storage space. Whenever needed, DOs can request the TPA to verify the integrity of outsourced data files. Specifically, the TPA will generate an auditing challenge and sends it to the CSP. Upon receiving the auditing challenge, the CSP generates an auditing proof and return it to the TPA. Based on the auditing proof, the TPA can verify the integrity of outsourced data files.
B. THE DESIGN GOALS
Public auditability, audit soundness are the basic security requirements for a public cloud auditing scheme. Our proposed scheme must achieve these goals too. In addition, our proposed scheme is designed to have three extra goals: privacy-preserving, constant-size, and high-efficiency, as previously highlighted in Subsection I. B.. Here is a brief description.
1) Public auditability: The TPA is allowed to verify the integrity of data files on behalf of DOs. There is no any interaction between the DOs and the CSP in this process. 2) Audit soundness: Any CSP without storing the DOs' intact data files cannot pass the TPA's auditing. 3) Privacy-preserving: The curious CSP and TPA cannot obtain any real data contents of the DOs' files. 4) Constant-size: The communication overhead of the audit phase is a very small constant. 5) High-efficiency: Corrupted data files can be searched quickly when the batch auditing task fails.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces the security assumption, some definitions, and algorithmic descriptions, which are necessary for our scheme.
A. SECURITY ASSUMPTION
The security of our scheme is built on the hardness assumption of the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) [34] .
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP):
Given a multiplicative cyclic group G with prime order p, g is a generator of group G. It takes g, g a ∈ G as inputs, to find a ∈ Z * p . Suppose that it is computationally infeasible to solve the DLP in G within a probability polynomial time.
B. DEFINITIONS 1) BILINEAR MAPS
Given two multiplicative cyclic groups G and G T with prime order p, and g is a generator of G. Define a bilinear map e : G × G → G T with the following properties [35] : 1) Computability: There is an efficiently computable algorithm for computing a map e :
2) POLYNOMIAL COMMITMENT TECHNIQUE
The polynomial commitment technique is based on an algebraic property of polynomials φ(x) ∈ Z p [x] that (x − r) can divide the polynomial φ(x)−φ(r) for any r ∈ Z * p . For detailed definitions and security analyses, please refer to [36] .
Polynomial Commitment Technique: Given a multiplicative cyclic group G with prime order p, g is a generator of
Choose a random value r ∈ Z * p and compute
Then use the method of the polynomial division to compute polynomial ϕ(x) as follows.
Given a value α ∈ Z * p , compute
as the commitment of polynomial ϕ(x).
3) LUCAS SEQUENCE
The Lucas sequence [37] is a vital technique for the identification of corrupted data files in our scheme. The Lucas sequence is an improved version of the Fibonacci sequence, and each Lucas number can be represented by the sum of two Fibonacci numbers, not vice versa. That is,
where F(n) represents the Fibonacci number, L(n) represents the Fibonacci number. Lucas Sequence: A sequence {L n } is called the Lucas sequence that satisfies the property:
General Term:
The Lucas sequence's general term is
Property:
1) When the number of the sequence is bigger, the ratio between the former and the latter is closer to (1− √ 5)/2, which is approximately equal to the golden ratio of 0.618. 2) Any positive integer can be expressed as a sum of several Lucas numbers because the first Lucas number and the second Lucas number are ''2'' and ''1'' respectively.
C. ALGORITHMS DESCRIPTIONS
Our scheme, to be detailed in the next Section, consists of two phases: Storage phase and Audit phase. These two phases can be described by six algorithms, which are the foundation of our scheme. These algorithms are similar to those in existing public cloud auditing schemes [25] , [31] , [38] - [40] . We slightly modify these algorithms in order to achieve our design goals. Storage Phase: This phase is composed of the Setup, KeyGen, SigGen algorithms.
• cp ← Setup(λ): This algorithm is run by the CSS.
Input a security parameter λ, it outputs the common parameters cp and makes it public.
• sk, pk, (
This algorithm is run by each DO independently. Input cp, it outputs DO's secret key sk, public key pk, s random values (β 1 , β 2 , · · · , β s ), a random value α. The DO makes pk, α public and keeps sk, (β 1 , β 2 , · · · , β s ) secret.
•
The algorithm is run by each DO independently. The DO inputs the cp, sk, pk, (β 1 , β 2 , · · · , β s ), and raw data file F, this algorithm outputs the file tag Tag F , the blinded data file F and the authentication meta set . Then, the DO sends {Tag F , F , } to the CSP and deletes the raw data file and blinded data file from his local storage. Audit Phase: This phase consists of the Challenge, ProofGen, ProofVer algorithms.
• Q ← Challenge(cp, Tag F , pk): This algorithm is run by the TPA. It takes the common parameters cp, the data tag Tag F , the DOs' public key pk as inputs, and outputs an auditing challenge Q.
• P ← ProofGen(F , Q, pk, α): This algorithm is run by the CSP. It takes the blinded file F , the auditing challenge Q, the DOs' public key pk and random value α as inputs, and outputs an auditing proof P.
• 1/0 ← ProofVer(Tag F , pk, Q, P): This algorithm is run by the TPA. It takes the data tag Tag F , the DOs' public key pk, the auditing challenge Q, the auditing proof P as inputs, and outputs 1/0.
IV. THE PROPOSED BATCH AUDITING SCHEME
In this section, we describe our proposed batch auditing scheme and search method of corrupted data files based on the Lucas sequence in detail. Fig. 3 shows algorithm flow chart of the batch auditing scheme. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 give the search method of corrupted data files under two different scenarios: special situation (the total number of data files being audited is equal to a Lucas number) and general situation (the total number of data files being audited is an arbitrary positive integer).
A. HIGH DESCRIPTION OF OUR SCHEME
As mentioned earlier, our scheme consists of two phases: Storage phase and Audit phase, and a total of six algorithms. Storage Phase: This phase contains three algorithms. We assume that N DOs need CSP to provide cloud storage services in this CSS and θ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N } holds in this phase, where θ represents the identity of the θ -th DO.
• Setup: This algorithm is run by the CSS. Input a security parameter λ, the CSS chooses a large prime p, two multiplicative cyclic groups G and G T with prime order p, g is a generator of G, then defines a bilinear map e : G × G → G T . The CSS also randomly chooses a collision-resistant hash function h(·) : {0, 1} * → Z p , which maps arbitrary strings uniformly to Z p . In addition, it sets a Pseudo-random Function (PRF) ψ :
• KeyGen: This algorithm is run by each DO. For simplicity, suppose that each DO only has one data file, which is divided into η data blocks. For DO θ , he chooses a random value k (θ ) ∈ Z * p as his secret key sk (θ) , and computes
p as the RMT's blinding factors for his data file, and chooses a value α (θ ) ∈ R Z * p for the generation of the metadata. Subsequently, he keeps k (θ) , β
s secret and makes K (θ ) , α (θ ) public.
• SigGen: This algorithm is also run by each DO.
(1) The DO θ processes his data file and generates the file tag. Given a data file F (θ) , it can be divided into the following form: Data file F (θ ) is divided into η data blocks, i.e.,
To ensure the integrity of the unique data file identifier ID F (θ ) ∈ Z * p , the DO θ computes
as the tag of the file F (θ ) , where SSig sk (θ) (ID F (θ ) ) is the signature of the data file F (θ ) under the secret key sk (θ ) .
To guarantee the data confidentiality of the file F (θ ) , the DO θ employs RMT to blind each data block f ∈ R G for file F (θ ) and save {u (θ ) , ID F (θ ) } locally. Then calculate
Blind each data blocks:
where i = 1, 2, ···, η and j = 1, 2, ···, s. Finally, the data file
(2) The DO θ generates the authentication meta set.
Computē
as the metadata for each data block f
} to the CSP. Meanwhile, he deletes the raw data file F (θ ) and blinded data file F (θ ) from his local storage. Audit Phase: This phase contains three algorithms. To ensure the integrity of stored data files, assume thatÑ DOs almost send auditing requests to the TPA simultaneously in this CSS, i.e.,Ñ data files need to be audited by the TPA. N ≤ N and θ ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,Ñ } hold in this phase.
• Challenge: After receivingÑ auditing requests within a certain period, the TPA first verifies their validity and generates an auditing challenge Q as follows. Pick a positive integer c ≤ η, a random value r ∈ Z * p , keys k ψ ∈ R Z * p and k π ∈ R Z * p for PRF ψ and PRP π respectively. These values r, k ψ and k π are different for each batch auditing tasks of the same data files. For detailed explanation, please read Subsection V. B.
Output the auditing challenge Q = {c, r, k ψ , k π } and send it to the CSP.
• ProofGen: After receiving the auditing challenge Q, the CSP generates an auditing proof P as follows. For ς ∈ {1, 2, · · · , c}, compute i ς ← π k π (ς ) and v ς ← ψ k ψ (ς ) as the position indexes and corresponding coefficients of the challenged data blocks respectively.
For j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , s}, compute
Define a polynomial φ µ (θ ) (x) as follows.
Employ the polynomial division to compute the polynomial:
where
is the coefficient set of the polynomial ϕ ω (θ) (x). Finally, compute
as the aggregated metadata.
Output the auditing proof P = {γ , C, σ } and return it to the TPA.
• ProofVerify: After receiving the auditing proof P, the TPA performs batch auditing task as follows. Compute
and check the following verification equation:
If the verification equation (3) holds, this algorithm outputs ''1'' and the TPA believes that all audited data files are intact. Otherwise, this algorithm outputs ''0'' and the TPA thinks that some audited data files have been corrupted.
B. A LUCAS SEQUENCE-BASED SEARCH METHOD OF CORRUPTED DATA FILES
In Subsection IV. A., the verification equation (3) holds if and only if all the data files being audited are intact, and fails with a high probability once there is even one corrupted data file during the batch auditing. In an actual situation of IoMT, corrupted data files may be caused by accidental data corruption or CSP's malicious damage. Thus, it is possible that there are corrupted data files in batch auditing process. To further identify these corrupted files, we use a recursive divide-and-conquer approach based on the Lucas sequence. This design bears the similar idea of Binary search, but it is more effective than Binary search. Furthermore, we introduce a prior probability to our proposed search method (Lucas search). That is, we put some correct-prone data files in the first part and prioritize this part. Due to the particularity of the Lucas number and the reality of the actual medical environment, we specifically analyze two cases: special scenario and general scenario and show the detailed description of two different scenarios as follows. For detailed comparisons between our proposed method and Binary search, please read Subsubsection VI. C. 3).
Special Scenario
Specially, we suppose that the total number of data files being audited is equal to a Lucas number L(n). The special scenario always directly divides these audited data files into two parts, satisfying the formula as following form.
If the batch auditing task fails, we divide these files into two parts, the first part contains L(n − 2) files, and the second part contains L(n − 1) files. The first part (L(n − 2) files) is preferentially verified by the TPA. 1) If the first part (L(n−2) files) passes the TPA's auditing, it means that corrupted files must belong to the second part (L(n − 1) files). We divide the second part (L(n − 1) files) into L(n − 3) and L(n − 2) directly. Let L(n − 3) files be a new first part and accept the TPA's batch auditing again till corrupted files are found. The flow chart is shown in Fig. 4 (a) . 2) If the first part (L(n − 2) files) cannot pass the TPA's auditing, it means that corrupted files must belong to this part (L(n − 2) files), and they may also belong to the second part (L(n − 1) files). We divide the L(n − 2) files into L(n−4) and L(n−3), and the L(n−4) files (as a new first part) accept the TPA's auditing, the analysis of this part (L(n − 4) files) is the same as the initial first part (L(n − 2) files). Meanwhile, TPA also continues to audit the second part (L(n − 1) files). If this part (L(n − 1) files) passes the TPA's auditing, it indicates that the L(n − 1) files are intact, and then, the TPA finishes the auditing of this part, as shown in Fig. 4(b) . Otherwise, we divide the second part (L(n − 1) files) into L(n − 3) and L(n − 2), and the L(n − 3) files accept the TPA's auditing, as shown in Fig. 4 (c) . In the following figures, yellow indicates that it needs to be audited by TPA, solid lines indicate that it has to be performed, dotted lines indicate that it does not need to be performed.
General Scenario
Generally, we assume that the total number of data files being audited is an arbitrary positive integer L(n) (L(n) may be a Lucas number, or maybe not.). The general scenario always indirectly divides these audited data files into two parts, satisfying the formula as following form.
where L(n), L(n − 1), L(n − 2) are arbitrary positive integers.
If the batch auditing task fails, we divide these files into two parts, one part contains L 1 (n) files, where L 1 (n) is the largest Lucas number less than L(n), and the other part contains L(n) − L 1 (n) files. Further, we divide the L(n) − L 1 (n) files into two parts, one part contains L 2 (n) files, where L 2 (n) is the largest Lucas number less than L(n)−L 1 (n), and the other part contains L(n) − L 1 (n) − L 2 (n) files. After m subdivisions, the L(n) files are subdivided into m + 1 parts (m is a very small positive integer), and the number of files contained in each part is a Lucas number. That is, L(n) can be represented as the sum of several Lucas numbers as the following form:
To move one step forward, we divide L (n) files into L (n − 2) and L (n − 1), where
as the second part. Let the first part to accept the TPA's auditing. The subsequent analyses are similar to the above special scenario, so here is omitted. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we first prove the correctness of our batch auditing scheme. Then, we evaluate the security of our scheme in terms of the privacy preservation and auditing soundness.
A. CORRECTNESS

Theorem 1: Our proposed batch auditing scheme is correct.
Proof: We prove the correctness of our batch auditing scheme by verifying the correctness of the verification equation (3) as follows.
We made a detailed calculation of the following equation:
Therefore, our proposed batch scheme is correct.
B. PRIVACY PRESERVATION
Theorem 2: Our proposed scheme satisfies the following properties in preserving data confidentiality of DOs' files.
1.The curious CSP cannot obtain any real data contents when it provides data storage services to each DO.
2.The curious TPA cannot derive any real data contents when it performs the batch auditing task for each DO.
Proof: 1. To guarantee the data confidentiality of the data file F (θ ) , the DO θ employs the RMT to blind data file in the storage phase. For detailed blinding, please read the equation (1) and equation (2) in Subsection IV A.. The only way for the curious CSP can successfully get the data contents is to know β
Unfortunately, it is computationally infeasible for the CSP to compute β (θ ) j because of the hardness assumption of DLP, i.e., given u (θ ) ,
. Thus, the curious CSP cannot derive any real data contents from the blinded file F (θ) when it provides data storage services to DO θ . In addition, the DO θ only needs to save β
and u (θ) locally and get the complete blinded data file returned by the CSP, he then can recover the original data file.
2. In the audit phase, when the curious TPA receives the auditing proof P = {γ , C, σ }, he cannot obtain the blinded data contents from the γ and C. One reason is that these values r, k ψ , and k π are different for each batch auditing tasks of the same data files. It means that TPA cannot perform cs times verification of these challenged data blocks and get these data contents by solving a system of linear equations. Thus, the TPA cannot get the DOs' data contents through γ . Another reason is that DLP is computationally infeasible in G within a probability polynomial time. Without loss of generality, C can be expressed as the following form:
∈ G as inputs, it is hard to calculate δ ∈ Z * p in G within a probability polynomial time. Although δ contains the DOs' data contents, it is difficult to calculate δ in G. Therefore, the TPA is unable to obtain the data contents of the files F (θ ) according to the auditing proof P, let alone to get the real data contents of the files F (θ) .
C. AUDITING SOUNDNESS
Theorem 3:
In the audit phase, the auditing proof can successfully pass the TPA's verification if and only if the CSP honestly stores the DOs' intact data files.
Proof: If the CSP wins a game, named Game 1, by forging a valid auditing proof on incorrect data files, then we will find a solution to a DLP instance in G with a high probability of 1 − 1/p, which contradicts with the intractability assumption of DLP in G.
Suppose the TPA has a DLP instance, i.e., G is a multiplicative cyclic group with order p, for two arbitrary elements a, b ∈ G, there exists τ ∈ Z * p such that b = a τ . Now we describe Game 1 as follows.
Game 1: Suppose TPA already has a valid auditing proof P = {γ , C, σ } from CSP based on the auditing challenge Q = {c, r, k ψ , k π }, then P = {γ , C, σ } must satisfy the verification equation (3) . Suppose some DOs' data files have been corrupted, the malicious CSP will forge an auditing proofP = {γ ,Ĉ, σ } on the incorrect data files according to the auditing challenge Q = {c, r, k ψ , k π }. The CSP will win the Game 1 if the forged auditing proofP can pass the TPA's verification. Otherwise, the CSP fails. We will prove that if the CSP can win the Game 1, the TPA can solve an arbitrary DLP instance.
First of all, for simplicity, we define some necessary notions:
Apparently, there is at least one element of { µ
, that is nonzero because intact files and corrupted files are different. We assume that the malicious CSP has won the Game 1. According to our scheme, the following eqnarray (4) holds.
Because P is a valid auditing proof, eqnarray (5) must hold.
Combining the eqnarray (4) and eqnarray (5), we can learn that the eqnarray (6) must hold.
After proper simplification, we have get that
Without loss of generality, given above DLP instance, each K (θ )(α (θ ) −r) ϕ ω (θ ) (α (θ ) ) can be generated as
where τ
(θ )
a and τ
b are random values of Z p . Then we have
Clearly, we can find a solution to the DLP instance. Given two arbitrary elements a, b ∈ G, there exists τ ∈ Z * p such that b = a τ , where τ can be easily calculated as follows.
The eqnarray (8) always holds if the denominator is non-zero. However, as defined in Game 1, the values of each γ (θ) are non-zero because there is at least one element of { µ
b is a random value of Z p , the denominator is zero with a probability of 1/p, which is negligible because p is a big prime. It means that once the malicious CSP wins Game 1, we can find a solution to solve the DLP in G with a high probability of 1 − 1/p, which contradicts with our assumption that DLP is computationally infeasible in G.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our scheme. Firstly, we discuss the communication and computation overhead of our batch auditing scheme. Secondly, based on the experimental results, we discuss performance comparisons from three aspects in terms of constant-size communication overhead, data confidentiality, and search method of corrupted data files. Some necessary notations are given in Table 1 .
A. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
The communication overhead of our scheme primarily comes from the SigGen algorithm of storage phase and Challenge and ProofGen algorithms of audit phase. In the storage phase, when a DO sends {Tag F , Fąŕ, } to the CSP, the communication overhead is |T | + η · |G| + ηs · |p|. In the audit phase, the communication overhead of the TPA sending an auditing challenge Q = {c, r, k ψ , k π } to the CSP is 3|p| + |c|. The communication overhead of the CSP sending an auditing proof P = {γ , C, σ } to the TPA is 2|G| + |p|. Thus, the total communication overhead of audit phase in our scheme is 2|G| + 4|p| + |c|, which is a very small constant. By accumulating all DOs' overhead, the total communication overhead of our scheme is (N η + 2) · |G| + (N ηs + 4)|p| + N |T | + |c|.
B. COMPUTATION OVERHEAD
For simplicity, the time-consuming operations that we mainly consider multiplication, hash, exponentiation and bilinear pairing. We omit the computation cost of the addition, PRG, and PRF, because they are more lightweight compared with other operations listed above.
In the storage phase, the computation overhead of each DO blinding the data file is s · H Z + s · Exp G + ηs · Mul G . The computation overhead of each DO generating the authentication meta set is 2η · Exp G + (ηs − η) · Mul G + η · H Z . In the audit phase, the computation overhead of the CSP generating the auditing proof is [(2s
The computation overhead of the TPA verifying the integrality for these outsourced data files is (Ñ + 2) · Exp G + 2Ñ · Mul G + 3Pair. The computation overhead of this phase is [(2s
Thus, by accumulating all DOs, the total computation overhead of our scheme is
C. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
This subsection describes experimental evaluations of our scheme and compares our scheme to other existing schemes. All the following experiments are run at a Linux OS with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @3.60GHz processor and 8GB memory. The network is the campus network, and the speed of uploading and downloading is 1.2Mbps. We utilize C language with the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic (GMP) Library, and the Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) Library. According to the general assumption, we set the base field size to be 512bits, |G| = 160bits, |p| = 160bits, |T | = 32bits, |c| = 32bits. Each type of experiment runs 100 times, and the average value is calculated.
1) CONSTANT-SIZE COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
One of the most significant features of our scheme is that the communication overhead of the audit phase is constantsize. We compare the communication cost of the audit phase between our scheme and the existing batch auditing schemes [31] - [33] , [41] - [43] , which are state-of-the-art in recent years. As shown in Table 2 , the communication overhead of the audit phase, only in our scheme, is constantsize, while other schemes are growing linearly. We show these comparisons between these existing schemes and ours in the following aspects: the relationship between the communication overhead and data files being auditedÑ (Fig. 6) , the relationship between the communication overhead and data blocks being challenged c (Fig. 7) , the relationship between the transmission time cost and data files being auditedÑ (Fig. 8) , and the relationship between the transmission time cost and data blocks being challenged c (Fig. 9) . In our scheme, the communication overhead of the audit VOLUME 7, 2019 phase is 0.125KB, which is an extremely small constant and approximates to the X-axis, as shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 . Therefore, our scheme has obvious advantages in the aspect of the communication overhead of the audit phase, which is more suitable for the poor network environment. In addition, we also show the comparison of the computation overhead in audit phase between our scheme and existing batch auditing schemes [31] - [33] , [41] - [43] in Table 3 . As shown in Table 3 , our batch auditing scheme does not cause significant computation overhead, while reducing the communication overhead for the audit phase to a very small constant. What's more, we show the comparison about computation cost in the audit phase between our scheme and existing schemes in Fig. 10 . By combining computation overhead and communication overhead, we show a time-consuming comparison of the whole audit phase. As shown in Fig. 11 , our batch auditing scheme has a slight advantage in the audit phase, which is slightly lower than schemes [31] - [33] and significantly lower than schemes [41] - [43] .
2) PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF DATA FILES
The second feature is privacy preservation, that is, the curious TPA and CSP cannot get any real data contents of data files. In the storage phase, before DOs upload data files to the CSP, they adopt RMT to blind their data files, which can protect the data privacy against the curious CSP. In the audit phase, the TPA cannot obtain any data contents from the auditing proof. In order to fully prove the data privacy protection only generates a very little extra burden on each DO, we define a hypothetical scheme A, which is the same as our scheme but only without blinding DOs' raw data files through RMT. The comparison of the computation cost of each DO (Fig. 12 ) and the comparison of the time cost of the storage phase (Fig. 13)   FIGURE 12 . The relationship between the computation overhead of each DO and data blocks η (s = 100). are given. The cost of our scheme is slightly higher than the scheme A both in Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 . For example, as shown in Fig. 12 , when the number of data blocks η is equal to 10,000, the time cost of the scheme A is 2,303s, whereas the one for our scheme is 2,450s, the gap is only 2.45 minutes. Therefore, we believe that it is worth paying a little extra computation cost to protect DOs' data privacy, and it is also acceptable for the ordinary terminal DOs.
3) SEARCH METHOD OF CORRUPTED DATA FILES
It is the most important feature that a novel search method (Lucas search) of corrupted data files is designed in this paper. Most of the existing batch auditing schemes only give a specific scheme, which can achieve some significant functions, such as dynamic updating of data or multicloud storage. However, few of them specifically refer to search methods of corrupted data files once the batch auditing task fails. We compare the search time of corrupted files between the Lucas search (the method is proposed by our scheme) and Binary search [44] (the method is proposed by schemes [31] , [45] ). The Lucas search only audits 38.2% of all data files at a time, while Binary search needs to audit 50% of all data files at a time. It means that the computational VOLUME 7, 2019 burden of TPA and CSP is greatly reduced in our designed method. According to [31] and [45] , the ratio of error files to correct files is quite small. Without loss of generality, we assume that this ratio is 0.1% and the prior probability is 90% in our experiments. Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 show the comparisons of the search time of corrupted data files between Lucas search and Binary search in the special scenario and general scenario, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 14, for simplicity, we set the number of data blocks is 500. When the number of data files being audited is a Lucas number 123, the Lucas search method needs 40.05s, the Binary search method is 43.84s. The difference is very small, only 3.79s, because the Lucas number 123 is undersized for the IoMT environment. However, when the number of data files being audited is Lucas number 15,127, the Lucas search needs 3,886s, the Binary search needs 4,449s. The gap between them is quite obvious and reaches 563s.
When the number of data files being audited is an arbitrary positive integer, we present a three-dimensional comparative analysis diagram, as shown in Fig. 15 . When the number of data files being audited is 23,870 and the number of data blocks is 1,032, the Lucas search takes about 12,380s to identify corrupted data files, and the Binary search needs about 14,222s. The gap between them is quite obvious and reaches 1,842s.
According to the above comparison analyses, the Lucas search has a clear advantage over Binary search in the searching time of corrupted data files, whether special scenario or general scenario.
VII. CONCLUSION
The IoT is an exciting and transformative emerging technology trend that is gaining popularity in several application domains. The IoMT is one of the most promising fields in these application domains. In this paper, we propose an efficient batch auditing scheme and a novel search method of corrupted data files based on the Lucas sequence for IoMT. First, we utilize the self-query technique and polynomial commitment technique in the audit phase to reduce the com-munication overhead from the linear level to a constant. Next, we design a novel search method of corrupted data files based on the Lucas sequence, whose core idea is recursion. The special scenario (the number of the data files being audited is a Lucas number) and the general scenario (the number of the data files being audited is an arbitrary positive integer) are discussed respectively. Our batch auditing scheme not only achieves the above advantages, but also protects DOs' data privacy. That is, the TPA and CSP cannot obtain the real data contents of DOs' files, whether storage phase or audit phase. To better assess our proposed schemes, we present a detailed security and performance analyses, which show that our scheme is more secure and efficient. In terms of future work, we are going to improve the scheme to support multicloud storage and dynamic sharing.
